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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 We consider once again what are appropriate 
computer-related supervised release conditions for child 
pornography offenders.  Appellant Randy Albertson pled 
guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B).  The District Court 
sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment (the minimum 
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mandated) and 20 years’ supervised release with eight special 
conditions.  On appeal, Albertson challenges the 
reasonableness of the 20-year term and three of the special 
conditions of his supervised release, including a restriction on 
internet access, mandatory computer monitoring, and a 
restriction on his association with minors.  As we agree with 
Albertson only that a wholesale ban on his internet use is 
broader than necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals of 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we affirm the duration of the supervised 
release term and the association-with-minors restriction, 
vacate and remand the internet restriction, and remand the 
monitoring requirement for adaption to a more tailored 
internet restriction.  
I.  Background 
 Albertson’s problem with child pornography surfaced 
in 2005 when his wife discovered a pornographic image in his 
dresser drawer.  Despite the family’s efforts to monitor his 
computer access thereafter, Albertson, a former prison guard, 
continued viewing child porn online.  In addition, in 2006, 
Albertson’s wife (they are now divorced) reported to the local 
police that he had molested her teenaged daughter (his then-
stepdaughter).1
 Albertson was charged in a two-count superseding 
indictment with receipt and possession of child pornography, 
   Consequently, the police searched the family 
computer.  They found over 700 images of child porn, some 
of which featured pre-pubescent children.  
                                              
1 He was arrested for aggravated indecent assault, indecent 
exposure, and indecent assault of a person less than 16 years 
of age.  These charges were pending at the time of 
Albertson’s federal sentencing hearing and he has since been 
convicted of the indecent assault charge. 
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in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B).  He pled guilty to the receipt count and 
stipulated to 39 pornographic images.  Receipt of child porn 
carries a mandatory minimum of five years’ imprisonment, 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1), and that minimum was the jail term 
imposed here.  Five years’ supervised release is also required.  
18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).  In the plea, the parties agreed to a 
supervised release term of up to 25 years (with the parties 
able to argue at sentencing the appropriate term).   
 At his 2008 sentencing hearing, Albertson himself 
argued to the Court as follows: 
I found court cases—and this is through a 
Voeker (phonetic) case that I found that 
involves two individuals, a Crandon and a 
Lloyd (phonetic), both received out of the Third 
Circuit here under five year sentences for 
supervised release, the Lloyd being, they’re— 
from what I’ve read out of their cases, you 
know, they don’t even compare to my case, my 
background, or anything that I have ever done 
as far as law enforcement is concerned. I ask 
that you, you know, review that and think about 
even less time than five years [of supervised 
release] because those two cases, Crandon and 
Lloyd, they got less than five out of this district.  
I ask for the same thing. 
 The Government requested the maximum supervised 
release term permitted by the plea agreement—25 years.  It 
stated the nature of the offense and the relevant conduct—that 
over 700 pornographic images were found (including pre-
pubescent images) on Albertson’s computer, his wife’s 
discovery of an image, and his failure to abide by his family’s 
informal restrictions on his computer use.  
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 After imposing the 60-month prison term, the Court 
decided on a 20-year term of supervised release with eight 
special conditions.  Its primary considerations were the 
seriousness of the offense, the goal of “deter[ring 
Albertson’s] conduct in the future,” and the need “to protect 
the public.”  On these bases, it found “that an extended term 
of supervised release is appropriate.”   
 Albertson appeals three of the special conditions.2
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C § 3231, 
which provides the district courts of the United States with 
original jurisdiction over crimes against the laws of the 
United States.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
  
  He 
was: banned from “associat[ing] with children under the age 
of 18 (with the exception of his children) except in the 
presence of an adult who has been approved by the Probation 
Officer” (Special Condition 4); barred from “us[ing] a 
computer with access to any ‘on-line computer service’ 
without the prior written approval of the probation officer” 
(Special Condition 5); and required to submit to an initial 
inspection, and subsequent inspections, of his computer and 
to allow the installation of monitoring or filtering software 
(Special Condition 7).  The District Court did not discuss the 
details of these conditions nor did it provide specific reasons 
for imposing them.  On appeal, Albertson argues they subject 
him to a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary.  He 
relies principally on our decision in United States v. Miller, 
594 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2010).  There, as here, we were 
confronted with a ban on internet use that was imposed on a 
child porn offender as a special condition of his supervised 
release.  We concluded that the internet ban—which was 
imposed for life—was overbroad.  
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II.  Waiver 
 In his opening brief, Albertson argues solely that the 
20-year supervised release term is unreasonable.  He neither 
raises nor refers to the conditions of his supervised release.  It 
is only in his reply brief that he addresses those conditions 
and argues they are unlawful in light of Miller.  Thus, we 
address a threshold question of waiver.  
   Albertson’s reason for his untimeliness was that our 
decision in Miller was filed one day after his opening brief.  
He informed us that it had not occurred to him to challenge 
his conditions prior to our analysis in that case.  According to 
the Government, however, Albertson’s failure to challenge 
the conditions of his supervised release in his opening brief 
waived the argument.  It urged us to strike the reply brief or, 
at least, consider the argument waived.  Rather than strike the 
reply, we granted the Government’s request to file a sur-
reply.   
 It is standard practice that an appellant must state all 
issues raised on appeal in the opening brief.  See Fed. R. App. 
P. 28(a)(5); Third Cir. Local App. R. 28.1(a)(1).  Indeed, it is 
essential to our review that the appellant properly present all 
issues in his opening brief.  “It is well settled that an 
appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening 
brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”  United 
States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005); see, e.g., 
In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Inst. 
for Scientific Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publs., 
Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding waiver 
because “[n]owhere in the ‘Statement of the Issues Presented’ 
or the ‘Argument’ section of plaintiff’s appellate brief are [the 
district court’s] conclusions questioned”).  For these reasons, 
“we usually refrain from addressing an argument or issue not 
properly raised and discussed in the appellate briefing.”  
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Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 403 
(3d Cir. 2010) (Cowen, J., dissenting).  
 However, the rule does yield in “extraordinary 
circumstances.”  See Simmons v. City of Phila., 947 F.2d 
1042, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991).  Though our case law repeats the 
rule—waiver absent extraordinary circumstances—we have 
yet to flesh out the extraordinary circumstance exception.  We 
find instructive an approach set out by one of our sister courts 
of appeals.  In In re Kane, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
acknowledged, as we do, that it lacked explicit standards for 
“what constitutes such extraordinary circumstances.”  254 
F.3d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 2001).  It did, however, identify 
certain factors as “obvious” ones to consider: “whether there 
is some excuse for the failure to raise the issue in the opening 
brief; how far the opposing party would be prejudiced; and 
whether failing to consider the argument would lead to a 
miscarriage of justice or undermine confidence in the judicial 
system.”  Id.    
 We agree and adopt these principles.  Applied to the 
facts of Albertson’s case, we believe the balance weighs in 
favor of reviewing the merits of the challenge to his 
supervised release conditions.   
 With respect to the first factor, we appreciate that 
Albertson’s reason for failing to raise the issue in his opening 
brief is not compelling.  As noted, his counsel stated at 
argument that, prior to Miller, he had not realized that a 
challenge to the conditions might succeed.  This might be true 
as a subjective matter.  Objectively, however, the basis for 
Miller already existed in a line of cases, discussed below, 
concerning computer-related conditions of supervised release 
that were imposed on child porn offenders.  Thus, standing 
alone, the first factor does not cut against waiver.   
8 
 
 However, the second two factors do weigh against 
waiver.  The Government would suffer no prejudice in this 
case.  Not only was it permitted to file a sur-reply, but it then 
failed to pursue meaningfully its waiver argument in the sur-
reply.  This indicates that it would not be prejudiced 
significantly by our review of the merits.   
 Lastly, the miscarriage of justice factor is “somewhat 
similar to the ‘plain error’ rule, which is applied in the 
context of appeals from criminal trials, and allows appellate 
courts to consider defects at the trial level even when the 
defendant has failed to lodge an appropriate objection.”  
Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 169 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(Roth, J., concurring) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)).  In other 
words, we may consider an issue, despite the fact that it was 
improperly raised on appeal, if the District Court plainly erred 
in such a way as to affect the appellant’s substantial rights.  
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Thielemann, 575 
F.3d 265, 270 n.9 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993)).  “[E]ven where plain 
error exists [that affects substantial rights], our discretionary 
authority to order correction is to be guided by whether the 
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Knight, 
266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001).  If forced to ignore the 
challenge in this case, we turn a blind eye to supervised 
release conditions that are directly contrary to the line of 
cases, discussed below, governing the propriety of internet 
restrictions for child porn offenders in this Circuit.  To do so 
would seriously “undermine confidence in the judicial 
system.”  In re Kane, 254 F.3d at 331. Accordingly, on 
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balance, the In re Kane factors we adopt tilt in favor of our 
review of the merits.3
 Because we conclude that Albertson’s arguments are 
not waived, we turn to the merits of his appeal.
  
III.  The Special Conditions of Supervised Release 
4
                                              
3 Our reasoning in Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001), also counsels 
against waiver.  In that case, involving an interlocutory appeal 
of a class certification issue, the defendants contended that 
the plaintiffs had not preserved the issue of superiority—a 
criterion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3)—because they did not address the issue in 
their initial brief.  We rejected the waiver argument because 
“[a]lthough the plaintiffs d[id] not address superiority directly 
in their brief, they raise[d] the issue specifically in their reply 
brief, and the facts and arguments on superiority [we]re 
present throughout their [opening] brief.”  Id. at 191 n.35.  As 
such, “[w]e believe[d] that the issue of superiority was 
implicit in the plaintiffs’ opening brief and was thus 
adequately raised on appeal.”  Id.  Though a challenge to the 
special conditions of supervised release is perhaps not so 
obviously subsumed within a reasonableness challenge as is 
the issue of superiority in a class action certification case, to 
the extent that it is, our reasoning in Newton weighs against 
waiver.    
 
4   We agree with the Government that, because Albertson did 
not object to the special conditions of supervised release at 
sentencing, our review is for plain error.  United States v. 
Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 
  A sentencing 
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judge has wide discretion in imposing terms of supervised 
release.  Subsections 3583(d)(1) and (2) authorize a 
sentencing court to impose conditions of supervised release 
provided they are reasonably related to the 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) factors5
                                              
5  The factors include: 
 and involve “no greater deprivation of 
liberty than is reasonably necessary” to fulfill the purposes set 
out in that provision.  See United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 
241, 248 (3d Cir. 2005).  Accordingly, as the Sentencing 
Commission acknowledges, we review the reasonableness of 
a supervised release term against the § 3553(a) factors, 
recognizing that “the primary purpose of supervised release is 
to facilitate the integration of offenders back into the 
community rather than to punish them.”  U.S. Sentencing 
 (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant; (2) the need for the sentence 
imposed . . . (B) to afford adequate deterrence 
to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public 
from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to 
provide the defendant with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) 
the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 
established for [the offense as set forth in the 
Guidelines] . . . ; (5) any pertinent policy 
statement . . . [;] (6) the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the 
need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense. 
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Comm’n, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release 
8-9 (2010).  Notably, in addition to the sentencing goals 
enumerated, § 3553(a) also requires parsimony—that “[t]he 
court impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary.”   
A. The Internet Ban & the Monitoring Requirement 
 According to Albertson, the requirements that he not 
use a computer with any form of “online” access unless pre-
approved by his probation officer, and the attendant 
monitoring of his computer usage, are disproportionate to his 
criminal history and offense characteristics.  Thus, he argues, 
they are overbroad.   
 As noted above, we have recently dealt with a similar 
question in Miller, in which a child porn offender was 
sentenced to a lifetime term of supervised release that banned 
access to the internet.  In ruling that the condition was 
overbroad, we reviewed our case law on “supervised release 
conditions restricting computer and internet usage for child 
pornography offenders.”  594 F.3d at 185; see Thielemann, 
575 F.3d 265; United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 
2007); United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 
2003); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 
1999); see also United States v. Maurer, No. 10-3049, 2011 
WL 1519201 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2011).    
 Taken together, the Miller-Crandon line of cases 
yields three themes.  First, though not at issue here, a 
complete ban on the use of a computer and internet will rarely 
be sufficiently tailored to the § 3553(a) factors.  Our opinion 
in Voelker illustrates this point.  There, the defendant was 
banned from using all computers for life following a plea to 
receiving child pornography.  We ruled that the “outright 
lifetime ban” on computers was “the antithesis of a narrowly 
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tailored sanction, a greater deprivation of liberty than [was] 
reasonably necessary, and not reasonably related to the 
factors set forth in . . . § 3583.”  Miller, 594 F.3d at 185 
(quoting Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144-45) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
 Second, moving along the spectrum of restrictiveness, 
a complete ban on internet access, except with prior approval 
of probation, may be permissibly imposed temporarily on 
those offenders who have used or have clearly demonstrated a 
willingness to use the internet as a direct instrument of 
physical harm.  For instance, in Thielemann, Crandon, and 
Maurer the defendants used or demonstrated a willingness to 
use the internet to solicit, communicate with, or abuse a 
minor in conjunction with child porn offenses.  In 
Thielemann, the defendant encouraged his online chat 
companion to abuse sexually a minor girl in front of a 
webcam.  Moreover, Thielemann had several persons 
involved, and was the hub of the offensive conduct.  See 575 
F.3d at 268, 269 n.4.  Similarly, in Crandon the defendant 
used the internet to communicate, arrange to meet, and have 
sexual relations with a minor girl.  In Maurer, the defendant 
expressed an interest in sexual contact with minors while 
using the internet in the attempt to arrange a sexual encounter.  
Thielemann and Crandon both used the internet to encourage 
or otherwise initiate the sexual abuse of a minor, as 
distinguished from solely accessing pornographic sites.  
Maurer clearly demonstrated a willingness to use the internet 
for these same purposes.  We upheld, in their cases, 
conditions that proscribed all internet access for ten, three, 
and five years, respectively.   
 Finally, where the child porn offense does not involve 
a “live” component (that is, direct involvement or 
communication, including the attempt or demonstrated 
willingness to have direct involvement or communication, 
13 
 
with a putative victim via the internet), the district courts 
should consider whether a tailored internet limitation is 
feasible.  In Freeman, for example, the defendant pled to 
possessing and receiving child porn.  There, as here, he had 
also molested children in the past.  But absent the direct link 
between the internet and the abuse, we concluded that a 
blanket ban was overbroad.  We noted that “[t]here is no need 
to cut off [a child porn offender’s] access to email or benign 
internet usage when a more focused restriction, limited to 
pornography sites and images, can be enforced by 
unannounced inspections of material stored on [the 
offender’s] hard drive or removable disks.”  Miller, 594 F.3d 
at 186 (quoting Freeman, 316 F.3d at 392) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Building from these themes, we set out in Miller three 
factors for assessing whether a supervised release condition is 
overbroad.  We consider the scope of the condition first with 
respect to substantive breadth and second with respect to its 
duration.  Miller, 594 F.3d at 187 & n.9 (noting the similar 
factor-based approach adopted in United States v. Heckman, 
592 F.3d 400, 405-08 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Third, we assess “the 
severity of the defendant’s criminal conduct and the facts 
underlying the conviction, with a particular focus on whether 
the defendant used a computer or the internet to solicit or 
otherwise personally endanger children.”  Miller, 594 F.3d at 
187.     
 Because we are mindful of the interplay between 
prison time and the term of supervised release, we now add it 
as a fourth factor.  As a general matter, we agree with the 
Government that a district court may find it proper to impose 
a longer term of supervised release to follow a relatively 
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shorter term of imprisonment.6
 The duration of the supervised release term has an 
interesting twist.  We recognize that his 20-year term is 
shorter than the lifetime bans imposed in both Miller and 
   In this context, we believe 
that the proportion of a supervised release restriction to the 
total period of restriction (including prison time) is also 
relevant to our review.   
 We now apply these factors to Albertson’s case.  First, 
we note that the restrictiveness of the internet condition 
mirrors those in Thielemann and Crandon—no internet access 
unless preapproved by probation—a restriction that we 
recognize as sweepingly broad and, indeed, too broad unless 
the defendant has used the internet as an instrument of harm.  
See also Maurer, 2011 WL 1519201, at *7 (recognizing that, 
in addition to direct physical harm, an “expressed interest in 
minors, . . . coupled with [a] demonstrated willingness to use 
the internet as a means for arranging sexual encounters, 
presents a tangible risk to children,” and thus supports as 
reasonable a total internet ban).  As one of our sister courts of 
appeals has said, “such a ban renders modern life—in which, 
for example, the government strongly encourages taxpayers 
to file their returns electronically, where more and more 
commerce is conducted on-line, and where vast amounts of 
government information are communicated via website—
exceptionally difficult.”  United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 
878 (7th Cir. 2003).  This aspect of the scope factor favors 
Albertson. 
                                              
6 We do not imply, however, that, if there is a longer prison 
term, a shorter term of supervised release is necessarily 
appropriate.   
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Voelker.7  However, the length of the term must be 
considered relative to the defendant’s age.  We do not believe 
that there is a meaningful distinction between the lifetime ban 
we struck down in Miller and the 20-year term imposed here.  
Miller was 60 at the time of his sentencing and Albertson was 
42.  Assuming an 80-year life expectancy, the combined 
duration for each is essentially the same.8
 However, Albertson’s relatively short incarceration 
sentence suggests that the length of the supervised release 
term is reasonable.  Though we do not set a bright-line rule, 
we find no fault with Albertson’s sentence having a lengthy 
   
 Turning to the conduct factor, the aforementioned 
cases show that a key consideration is whether the defendant 
used the internet “to actively contact a child and solicit sexual 
contact.”  Miller, 594 F.3d at 188.  Albertson did not.  With 
this in mind, we repeat what we said in Miller:  “While we do 
not intend to minimize the serious harm caused by possession 
of child pornography, [Albertson’s] use of the internet poses a 
danger that differs in both kind and degree from the conduct 
in Crandon and Thielemann.”  Id.  Thus, this factor favors 
Albertson.     
                                              
7  It is longer than those imposed in Thielemann, Freeman, 
Crandon, and Maurer.  These defendants received supervised 
release terms of ten, five, three, and five years, respectively.  
 
8See U.S. Nat’l Cntr. for Health Stat., Expectation of Life and 
Expected Deaths by Race, Sex, and Age: 2006, tbl. 105, 
available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s010
5.pdf.  According to that chart, Albertson’s life expectancy is 
78 and Miller’s 80. 
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“tail”—that is, his term of supervised release comprises 80% 
of the total 25-year period of restriction on his liberty.   
 With these factors in context, we approve the 20-year 
term of supervised release in itself, but the internet restriction 
condition fails for overbreadth because it is too restrictive.  If 
the District Court had a reason for imposing the type of 
internet restriction that we have typically reserved for 
offenders such as those in Crandon and Thielemann, it failed 
to state that reason.  Accordingly, we can do little more than 
“flounder in the zone of speculation.”  United States v. Loy, 
191 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  Thus we remand.     
 In contrast to the internet use restriction, Albertson’s 
computer monitoring condition—which requires him to 
submit his computer to inspections, and allow installation of 
monitoring or filtering software—would be generally 
acceptable if the internet restriction to which it applies is 
narrowly tailored and reasonable.  Moreover, the condition’s 
requirement that Albertson submit to initial and subsequent 
computer “examinations” finds statutory support in 18 U.S.C. 
17 
 
§ 3583(d)(3).9
                                              
9 It provides: 
The court may order, as an explicit condition of 
supervised release for a person who is a felon 
and required to register under the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act, that the 
person submit his person, and any property, 
house, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, 
other electronic communications or data storage 
devices or media, and effects to search at any 
time, with or without a warrant, by any law 
enforcement or probation officer with reasonable 
suspicion concerning a violation of a condition 
of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the 
person, and by any probation officer in the 
lawful discharge of the officer’s supervision 
functions. 
This language bears more so on Special Condition 6—
which requires Albertson to submit to searches of his 
computer upon reasonable suspicion—that he does not 
challenge.  However, we believe that it also supports 
the propriety of the monitoring condition, which is 
similar.  See Miller, 594 F.3d at 188 n.10 (discussing 
the interplay of the two types of special conditions).  
 
  Hence the inspections, coupled with the 
required installation of monitoring or filtering software, are 
reasonable methods of enforcing a more targeted internet 
restriction.  For these reasons, we discern no fault with 
similar monitoring conditions (that allow computer 
inspections and the installation of monitoring or filtering 
software) paired with a more tailored internet restriction.   
18 
 
 To sum up, in a time where the daily necessities of life 
and work demand not only internet access but internet 
fluency, sentencing courts need to select the least restrictive 
alternative for achieving their sentencing purposes.  In this 
case, the District Court may achieve that purpose through an 
internet prohibition and monitoring requirement to assure that 
Albertson does not engage in offensive conduct.10  We thus 
vacate both conditions and remand for that Court to fashion a 
“comprehensive, reasonably tailored scheme.”  Miller, 594 
F.3d at 188.11
                                              
10 In Freeman, we suggested that a ban on porn sites and 
images might be appropriate instead.  316 F.3d at 392.  We 
also note that “a prohibition on joining social networks 
frequented by children would serve to guard against 
recidivism without unjustly constraining [Albertson’s] liberty 
interests.”  Case Note, Criminal Law—Supervised Release—
Third Circuit Approves Decade-Long Internet Ban for Sex 
Offender.—United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (3d 
Cir. 2009), 123 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 783 (2010).   
11  We ask the District Court to state the safety benefits that 
will inure to the public from the internet restriction given the 
First Amendment concerns at stake.  See Loy, 237 F.3d at 264 
(noting that any ban must be directly related to the goals of 
protecting the public, deterrence, and rehabilitation, in 
addition to being narrowly tailored).  
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B. The Associational Condition 
 Albertson claims there is no support in the record for 
imposing a prohibition on associating with minors under age 
18 (except his family).  While it is true that “[a] district court 
must state the reasons in open court for imposing a particular 
special condition so that the appellate court is not left to 
speculate about the reasons,” Miller, 594 F.3d at 184, (and 
that was not done here), we may “[n]evertheless . . . affirm 
the condition if our own review of the record reveals any 
viable basis for the restriction.”  Id. at 189 (quoting Voelker, 
489 F.3d at 144) (internal quotation marks omitted).  At the 
time of his sentencing, Albertson had been charged with, 
among other things, indecent assault of his then-13- or 14-
year-old step-daughter, and has since been convicted of that 
crime.  There is thus ample support in the record for this 
condition.  Its propriety is further corroborated by our 
approval of a nearly identical condition in Miller.  594 F.3d at 
190.  Though Albertson’s condition does not explicitly allow 
for “casual encounters,” as did the one in Miller, we conclude 
that such a proviso is implicit in the condition:  “At this point, 
it is well established that associational conditions do not 
extend to casual or chance meetings.”  Id. at 191 n.11 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Accordingly, 
we believe the association-with-minors condition is 
adequately supported by the record and consistent with the 
goals set forth in § 3553(a) as they are incorporated into 
§ 3583(d).12
                                              
12 Albertson also challenges the reasonableness of the 20-year 
term on the remaining conditions of his supervised release—
both the general conditions and those special ones not dealt 
with above.  The appellant has the burden of demonstrating 
unreasonableness.  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 
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*    *   *   *   * 
 We affirm the duration of the 20-year supervised 
release term and the challenged associational restriction.  
However, we vacate and remand for further proceedings on 
the internet restriction (Special Condition 5).  We believe that 
a monitoring requirement is a reasonable means of enforcing 
a well-tailored internet restriction, but remand that condition 
(Special Condition 7) as well for any adjustments required in 
light of the re-fashioned internet restriction.      
 
                                                                                                     
332 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).  For the 
rationale already noted as to the duration of the internet ban, 
Albertson has not met that burden.   
